TMS stimulation over the inferior parietal cortex disrupts prospective sense of agency by Chambon, Valérian et al.
 1 
Research Article 
 
TMS stimulation over the inferior parietal cortex disrupts prospective sense of agency 
Valérian Chambon1,2*, James W. Moore3*, and Patrick Haggard4 
 
 
1 Institut Jean Nicod, Ecole Normale Supérieure, CNRS, UMR8129, 75005 Paris, France 
2 Department of Neuroscience, Biotech Campus-University of Geneva, 1211 Geneva, 
Switzerland 
3 Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths College, University of London, London SE14 6NW, 
UK 
4 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London WC1N 3AR, UK 
* equally contributing authors 
 
Word count: 7198 (excluding Abstract, Funding, References and Figure Legends) 
  
Address for correspondence: 
Valérian Chambon 
Ecole Normale Supérieure, Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives 
29, rue d’Ulm 
Paris 75005, France 
Email: valerian.chambon@ens.fr 
Phone: +33 (0)1 44 32 26 40 
Fax: +33 (0)1 44 32 26 42 
 
 2 
Abstract 
Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling an external event through one’s own 
action. On one influential view, sense of agency is inferred after an action, by 
“retrospectively” comparing actual effects of actions against their intended effects. However, 
it has been recently shown that earlier processes, linked to action selection, may also 
contribute to sense of agency, in advance of the action itself, and independently of action 
effects. The inferior parietal cortex (IPC) may underpin this “prospective” contribution to 
agency, by monitoring signals relating to fluency of action selection in dorso-lateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Here we combined transcranial stimulation (TMS) with 
subliminal priming of action selection to investigate the causal role of these regions in the 
prospective coding of agency. In a first experiment, we showed that TMS over left IPC at the 
time of action selection disrupts perceived control over subsequent effects of action. In a 
second experiment, we exploited the temporal specificity of single-pulse TMS to pinpoint the 
exact timing of IPC contribution to sense of agency. We replicated the reduction in perceived 
control at the point of action selection, while observing no effect of TMS-induced disruption 
of IPC at the time of action outcomes. 
Keywords: action selection; agency; inferior parietal cortex; dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; 
single-pulse TMS.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Healthy adults generally feel a sense of control over their own actions, and over the effects of 
those actions – a feeling that is classically referred as “sense of agency”.  Theoretical 
accounts identify several components of the sense of agency, including the feeling that 
actions are self-caused, involve one’s own body, and depend on one’s voluntary choices 
(Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). Psychometric studies generally consider agency as a synthetic 
experience in which these different components form a single composite mental content 
(Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Psychometric studies disagree, however, over whether agency 
is primarily a feeling, a judgement, or a metacognitive experience (Synofzik et al., 2008; 
Metcalfe & Greene, 2007). 
One influential computational model has proposed that sense of agency is computed by 
matching predicted and actual sensory consequences of movement (Blakemore et al., 1998; 
Farrer et al., 2008; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Sato, 2009). Thus, the sense of agency is strong 
when there is a close match between the predicted and the actually experienced consequences 
of an action, and is reduced when predicted and experienced consequences do not match 
(Linser & Goschke, 2007; David et al., 2008; Farrer et al., 2008). According to this view, 
sense of agency occurs late – after sensory evidence about the consequences of action 
becomes available. This view has received considerable empirical support from studies 
showing that temporal (Franck et al., 2001; MacDonald & Paus, 2003; Leube et al., 2003; 
David et al, 2007a) and spatial discrepancies (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Farrer et al., 
2003a; Synofzik et al., 2006; David et al., 2007a) between making an action and viewing 
visual feedback of the action reduce the sense that the observed action is one’s own. 
More recently it has been suggested that earlier processes, linked to action selection and 
preparation, can also contribute to sense of agency. In particular, subliminal priming of 
actions was shown to increase the feeling of control over the effects of those actions (Wenke 
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et al., 2010; Chambon & Haggard, 2012, Chambon et al., 2013), even though the primes did 
not improve the predictability of the effects themselves. Typically, participants are asked to 
respond to a left or right pointing arrow with a left or right key press respectively. The 
keypress causes a colour patch to be presented on a screen after a short delay. Participants are 
asked to judge how much control they feel over the patch of colour that follows their 
keypress action. Prior to the directional target a subliminal prime is presented, unbeknownst 
to the subject. The subliminal prime is a directional cue either congruent or incongruent with 
the target. Judgements of control over the colour presented after action are modulated by 
prime-target congruence: when the prime is compatible with the instruction arrow and with 
the keypress response, participants experienced more control over the effects of action than 
when the prime was incompatible with the target and the keypress (Wenke et al., 2010). Since 
the relation between primes and colour effects was statistically identical for compatible and 
for incompatible primes, this effect cannot be linked to the anticipation of the effects of 
action, such as the well-known phenomenon of ideomotor priming (Gentsch & Schütz-
Bosbach, 2011). Instead, the influence of prime compatibility is thought to depend on action 
selection processes, which necessarily occur prior to movement. Specifically, incompatible 
prime-target pairings are thought to decrease the fluency of action selection relative to 
compatible prime-target pairings, which in turn reduces the subsequent sense of agency. 
Results from action priming experiments thus suggest that the sense of agency is partly 
prospective, arising at the action selection stage, and not purely due to retrospective matching 
occurring after the effects of action are known. 
A recent fMRI study by Chambon et al. (2013) has highlighted specific brain regions 
that may underpin this influence of action priming on prospective agency. The results showed 
a network involving left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and left inferior parietal 
cortex (IPC – more specifically, the angular gyrus). According to the authors, DLPFC 
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activation would reflect willed action (see also Frith, 1991a). In contrast, DLPFC 
deactivation would signal dysfluency in the selection of willed action (as a consequence of 
prime-target incompatibility), resulting in a diminished sense of control over subsequent 
action outcomes. The IPC would monitor these signals relating to fluency or dysfluency of 
action selection emanating from DLFPC and use them to (pre)construct an experience of 
agency. Importantly, under this interpretation, this monitoring of fluency signals by IPC 
occurs prior to actions and their sensory consequences. 
 Although informative, this study is limited in two key ways. First, the evidence is 
indirect, because of the correlational nature of fMRI. Secondly, it is not possible to pinpoint 
the precise time at which these brain regions are involved owing to the relatively poor 
temporal resolution of fMRI. Nevertheless, the issue of timing is important for understanding 
how sense of agency is computed. Studies of implicit agency using chronometric measures 
have suggested that sense of agency has both a retrospective component, triggered by the 
occurrence of action effects, and a prospective component, that is present even if the action 
effect is omitted (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Voss et al., 2010). We hypothesised that the 
contribution of action selection fluency would occur predictively, in advance of the action 
outcome. Note that predictive and retrospective processes may be distinguished either by 
their dependence on outcome occurrence – such as in studies where the actual action effect is 
omitted (Moore & Haggard, 2008) –, or by their timing.  In the present study, the crucial 
information for prospective agency occurs prior to action, in action selection circuits. Thus, 
prospective agency does not require the action or the outcome to be registered, yet it can 
influence agency subsequently experienced by the subject over the outcome (Chambon et al., 
2013; Sidarus et al., 2014). 
We here addressed these two limitations by combining single-pulse transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) with subliminal priming of action selection and judgements of 
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control over action effects. If TMS-induced disruption of IPC and/or DLPFC influences 
perceived control over action effects, this will provide direct evidence that these regions are 
causally involved in sense of agency. Furthermore, we can exploit the temporal specificity of 
single-pulse TMS to pinpoint when these regions are involved, at the time of action selection, 
or at the time of action effects. 
We ran two experiments. In the first we compared the effects of TMS over left IPC and 
left DLFPC on action selection processing, by linking TMS to the presentation of the arrow 
target. We made directional predictions based on previous fMRI results.  
First, we found that DLPFC activity was associated with signalling dysfluency of 
action selection as a consequence of prime-target incompatibility, resulting in a relative 
deactivation of DLPFC on incompatible trials (Chambon et al., 2003). Therefore, impairing 
the DLPFC-mediated signalling of prime-target conflict should alter the reduction in agency 
on incompatible, relative to compatible, trials. 
Secondly, because IPC activation correlated with sense of control only on incompatible 
trials, we assumed that this area monitored signals of action selection conflict generated by 
DLPFC (Chambon et al., 2013). In this case, disruption of IPC should prevent this region 
from monitoring any conflict-related signals from DLPFC, and hence reduce the tendency for 
incompatibility primes to influence judgements of control. 
We found that although stimulation had an effect in the predicted direction for both 
brain regions, it was only significant for IPC. In Experiment 2 we therefore focussed on IPC 
and explored when it contributed to judgement of control. We compared the effects of TMS 
over left IPC at the time of action selection (directional arrow presentation), action execution 
(key press) and action effect (colour presentation). In order to keep the timing of the TMS 
pulse constant across prospective (response and target onsets) and retrospective (effect onset) 
conditions, stimulation was delivered 70 msec similarly after arrow presentation, key press, 
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and colour presentation. Note the duration of the resulting disruption to IPC processing is not 
fully known, but visual studies suggest disruptive effects of TMS last for around 100 msec 
(Thut et al., 2003), and up to 200 msec when single TMS pulse is applied over motor sites 
(Sanger et al., 2001), while TMS earlier than 60 msec would be ineffective (Amassian et al., 
1998). We therefore reasoned that, stimulating the IPC 70 msec after stimulus or response 
onset should have hindered any processing in this region up to 170-270 msec after that onset. 
This duration is consistent with findings of a self-other distinction based on corollary 
discharge occurring 100 msec post-stimulus in primary areas (e.g., Martikainen et al., 2005), 
or with the classical and well-established index of early matching processes (mismatch 
negativity) occurring with a typical latency of 150 to 250 msec post-stimulus (Garrido et al., 
2009). In this second experiment, we replicated the reduction in compatibility effects for IPC 
stimulation at the point of action selection shown previously in Experiment 1. This reduction 
was also present for stimulation at the point of action execution. Importantly, however, the 
compatibility effect was not reduced by IPC stimulation at the time of action effect 
presentation.  
 
 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Material & Methods 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
Twelve right-handed participants (7 females and 5 males aged 21–42 years), with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, were recruited to participate in the study. They provided written 
informed consent prior to the experiment and were paid £10 for their participation. All 
participants were without any known contra-indications to TMS (Keel et al., 2001). The 
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experiment was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee, and have therefore been 
performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
 
2.1.2. Apparatus and materials 
The visual display was presented on a 19’ computer screen (display mode= 800 ×  600 ×  32, 
60 Hz). The experiment was programmed and stimulations were delivered using the software 
Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, California, http://www.neurobs.com). 
Primes consisted of grey left or right pointing arrows that were followed and superimposed 
by metacontrast masks of the same luminance. The metacontrast masks also consisted of 
arrows that pointed to the left or the right (see Figure 1). Participants responded to the masks 
with keypress actions on the computer keyboard, using their left or right index finger. Prime 
and mask stimuli could appear randomly above or below fixation to enhance the masking 
effect (Vorberg et al., 2003). Effects were circular colour patches of red, green, blue, or 
yellow. All stimuli appeared on a grey background.  
Examples of each (left and right) mask stimulus were presented during experimental 
instruction so that participants would become acquainted with the target stimuli. No reference 
was made to the existence or appearance of the primes. 
 
2.1.3. Behavioural task 
The paradigm was based on that used previously by Chambon et al. (2013). The participants’ 
task was to judge, by pressing the left or right keys, how much control they had over colour-
effect stimuli that followed their keypress actions. The metacontrast masks that served as 
targets consisted of arrows that unambiguously pointed to the left or to the right. Subliminal 
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primes also consisted of left or right pointing arrows. Participants were required to press the 
key that corresponded to the direction of the mask/target (Figure 1). 
On half of the trials in each block at random, the prime and the mask/target (and 
therefore also the manual response, assuming that participants responded correctly) were 
compatible, while on the remaining trials they were incompatible. On prime-response 
compatible trials, the direction of the prime corresponded to the direction of the mask/target, 
and hence signalled the same response. On incompatible trials, prime and mask/target pointed 
in different directions. 
Action effects consisted of coloured circles that appeared on the screen 100, 300 or 500 
msec after the response. This jitter was introduced because action-effect delays strongly 
influence sense of agency (Haggard et al., 2002; Wenke et al., 2010), and was therefore 
expected to induce variations in the sense of control and increase the range of participants’ 
control ratings. The distribution of jitter was the same for all conditions, and thus orthogonal 
to the manipulation of prime-response compatibility. 
Coloured circles were of 4 different colours (red, green, blue, and yellow). The colour 
that participants saw on each trial depended whether the trial was prime-target compatible or 
prime-target incompatible. In each block, two colours (one for each hand) were assigned to 
prime-compatible responses, another two colours to prime-incompatible responses. 
Compatible effect-colours consistently followed compatible prime-target combinations (e.g., 
the colour red was shown when a left mask/target followed a left-pointing arrow prime). 
Incompatible effect-colours were consistently mapped to targets that did not correspond to 
the direction of the prime (e.g., the colour yellow was shown when a left mask/target 
followed a right-pointing arrow prime). Colours were rotated through compatibility 
conditions via a Latin square such that, across all six blocks, each colour appeared in each 
compatibility condition for each hand. After the colour effect was displayed, at the end of 
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each trial, participants judged how much control they felt they had over the colour effect by 
using a scale ranging from 1 (no control) to 8 (complete control).  
When making their judgment, participants were explicitly given the instruction to judge 
the extent to which they thought they had controlled the appearance of the coloured patch 
through their action. The control judgement therefore concerned the causal relationship 
between the action and the consequent effect, rather than simply the effect, or simply the 
action alone. Such control judgements are a standard way of assessing retrospective agency 
(Synofzik et al., 2003). 
 
2.1.4. Timeline 
Each trial began with a central fixation cross which remained visible until the colour-effect 
stimulus appeared. Primes were presented for 17 msec, followed by the mask after an SOA 
(Stimulus Onset Asynchrony) of 34 msec. These parameters were chosen because extensive 
previous studies consistently showed that conscious perception of prime direction is 
impossible with these temporal exposures (e.g., Vorberg et al., 2003; Lingnau & Vorberg, 
2005) and with exactly the same stimuli (Chambon et al., 2013; Chambon & Haggard, 2013; 
Sidarus et al., 2013). In particular, the prime-mask asynchrony strongly influences prime 
visibility. Vorberg et al. (2003) found that participants could not report the identity of the 
primes at prime–mask SOAs from 14 to 70 msec, even after extended practice of more than 
3000 trials. Moreover, none of our participants reported seeing anything prior to the target in 
a post-experiment debriefing, even when the prime was explicitly mentioned. 
Mask/target duration was 250 msec. Participants were asked to respond as fast as 
possible to the target arrows. The response window was set to 1200 msec. If participants 
failed to respond within this time window, or made an incorrect response to the mask/target, 
they saw a black X instead of a coloured circle. The coloured patches showing action effects 
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remained on the screen for 300 msec. After a jittered delay (grey background), a rating scale 
appeared for 1500 msec, allowing the participant to judge the level of control she felt over the 
colour patch. Again, if participants failed to make their rating within this time window, they 
saw a black X. Once the participant made her control judgment, the rating scale was replaced 
by a fixation cross until the end of the 1500 msec response window. The fixation cross 
persisted for a 3000 msec inter-trial interval. Each block ended with a pause lasting 30 s. 
TMS was applied 70 msec after the onset of the mask/target to DLPFC, IPC or as Sham 
stimulation. The duration of the resulting disruption to IPC processing is not fully known, but 
visual studies suggest disruptive effects of TMS last for around 100 msec (Thut et al., 2003). 
The order of the location of stimulation (DLPFC, IPC, or Sham) was counterbalanced across 
subjects, and is described in the next section. The experiment consisted of six blocks of 48 
trials each. When an error occurred in a trial, the corresponding trial was repeated at the end 
of each block (up to 5 error trials per block). Repeating error trials ensured that all colours 
were seen equally often, even if participants made response errors. 
 
 
2.1.5. TMS methods 
 
(a) Localization of brain sites 
Single-pulse TMS was delivered using a MagStim 200 magnetic stimulator and a 70-mm 
figure-of-8 coil (MagStim, Whitland, UK). We aimed to stimulate left IPC and left DLPFC, 
by placing the coil above activation peaks found in a previous fMRI study using the same 
behavioural task (Chambon et al., 2013). These peaks did not include the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), although prime-target incompatibility in the task clearly involved conflict 
signalling and monitoring. However, this absence of ACC activation is consistent with 
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studies showing that only conscious, but not subliminal, conflict, recruits the ACC (e.g., 
Dehaene et al., 2003). 
The activation peak for left IPC (x, y, z = –36, –69, 45 in MNI space) lay in the inferior 
parietal lobule (Brodmann area 39), near the superior edge of the temporal lobe, and 
immediately posterior to the supramarginal gyrus. Activation peak for left DLPFC (x, y, z = –
42, 9, 45) lay in the dorsal and posterior part of Brodmann area 9, caudal to BA 46 and rostral 
to BA 6. TMS coil placement according to the ‘10-20 method’ was used (Kessels et al., 2000; 
Okamoto et al., 2004). A medium-size 10-20 EEG stretch cap (g®.GAMMAcap, 
www.gtec.at) was used to define the 10-20 positions.  
Left IPC was reached by placing the coil directly over the P3 electrode position 
(Kessels et al., 2000; Muri et al., 2002; Vesia et al., 2010). A number of studies (Gerloff et 
al., 1997; Rossi et al., 2001; Herwig et al., 2003) identified electrode F3 as the closest 
electrode to target the left DLPFC. We corrected for the relatively posterior location of the 
left DLPFC activation in previous neuroimaging studies using the present paradigm (x, y, z = 
–42, 9, 45 in MNI space; Chambon et al., 2013) by targeting a site located 12 mm posterior to 
F3 and 12 mm anterior to FC3. In Sham stimulation trials, the coil was held over the vertex 
defined by the 10/20 system, but was rotated through 90 degrees, so that no current was 
induced in the brain. 
 
(b) Stimulation intensity 
TMS over most cortical areas other than primary visual and primary motor does not produce 
reliably reportable or observable effects on individual trials. The optimal methods for 
selecting stimulation intensity for non-motor areas remain unclear. Since our interest 
focussed on sense of agency accompanying voluntary actions, we particularly wanted to 
avoid inducing involuntary movements such as hand twitches, which are known to undermine 
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sense of agency (Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard & Clark, 2003). Some studies have linked 
levels of non-motor stimulation to the resting motor threshold. However, the motor threshold 
to TMS may not adequately represent the excitability of non-motor areas of the brain 
(Boroojerdi et al., 2002; Robertson et al., 2003; Oliver et al., 2009). In addition, we were 
concerned that this method would not sufficiently guard against involuntary TMS-induced 
movements, particularly for stimulations delivered around the time of voluntary action. 
Therefore, intensity of magnetic stimulation for IPC and DLPFC was defined individually 
prior to the experiment. Thus, intensity of magnetic stimulation was gradually increased by 
5% (e.g., 40%, then 45%, then 50%, etc.) until the stimulation produced twitches or was 
reported as uncomfortable by the participant. Once this threshold was reached, intensity was 
gradually decreased by 1% (e.g., 49%, 48%, 47%, etc.) up to a point where the twitch was no 
longer present and/or the participant no longer felt the discomfort. On average, this level was 
at an intensity of 53% of the stimulator output for IPC (mean = 52.91, S.D. = 2.46). This 
value is broadly consistent with that used in other studies stimulating the same region (Vesia 
et al., 2006; Vesia et al., 2008; Buelte et al., 2008; Prime et al., 2008). Using the same 
criterion, the intensity of stimulation for DLPFC was rather lower (mean = 46.0, S.D. = 2.44). 
Intensity of the stimulator output in the Sham condition was the same as that used in IPC 
condition (mean = 52.91, S.D. = 2.46). The effect of inter-individual variations in stimulation 
intensity on behavioural performance was tested in a sensitivity analysis (see below, Results 
section). 
All stimulation parameters were in accordance with the safety guidelines for magnetic 
stimulation (Wassermann, 1998). After completing the experiment, none of the participants 
reported any undesirable side effects as a result of the stimulation. 
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2.2. Data analyses 
Error rates (ERs) and response times (RTs) were analysed independently using a 2×3 
repeated-measures ANOVA with prime-target compatibility (compatible vs. incompatible) 
and stimulation site (DLPFC vs. IPC vs. Sham) as within-subjects factors. Control ratings for 
colour effects were analysed using a 2×3×3 repeated-measures ANOVA with prime-target 
compatibility, stimulation site, and action-effect interval (100, 300, 500 msec) as within-
subjects factors. Post-hoc Fisher tests were used to identify differences between conditions. 
Finally, we performed correlation analyses between control ratings and intensity of the 
stimulation for each TMS location (IPC and DLPFC). 
 
--------------- Insert Figure 1 about here --------------- 
 
2.3. Results 
 
2.3.1. Reaction times 
Participant’s responses to arrow target following compatible primes were faster than 
following incompatible primes (main effect of compatibility: F(1,11)=33.01, p<.001). Neither 
the main effect of stimulation site (F(2,22)=.38, p=.68) nor the interaction between 
compatibility and stimulation site were significant (F(2,22)=1.16, p=.33), indicating that 
TMS applied to either left IPC or DLPFC did not alter the facilitation effect of prime-target 
compatibility on mean RT that normally occurs under no-TMS (or ‘Sham’) conditions (see 
Wenke et al., 2010: Chambon et al., 2013). 
  
2.3.2. Error rates  
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Participants made more errors in incompatible than in compatible trials (main effect of 
compatibility: F(1,11)=8.68, p=.01). As for response times, neither the main effect of 
stimulation site (F(2,22)=2.78, p=.08) nor the interaction between compatibility and 
simulation site were significant (F(2,22)=1.59, p=.22). 
 
2.3.3. Control ratings 
Participants experienced higher levels of control over action effects following compatible 
prime-target associations (main effect of compatibility: F(1,11)=5.77, p=.03), consistent with 
previous results (e.g., Chambon et al., 2013). Importantly, this effect of prime-target 
compatibility on control ratings was modulated by the simulation site (F(2,22)=3.62, p=.04)  
(Figure 2). Thus, post-hoc tests showed that TMS applied to left IPC effectively abolished 
the effect of prime-target compatibility on control ratings (p=.86), whereas the compatibility 
effect remained highly significant in the Sham (p=.009) and DLPFC (p=.0008) conditions. 
Comparing trials between stimulation sites revealed an effect of TMS stimulation on 
compatible trials only, with lower control ratings in these trials when TMS was applied to 
IPC compared to DLPFC or Sham (compatible trials: IPC vs. Sham, p=.009; IPC vs. DLPFC, 
p=.01), and no other significant differences. 
 In addition, we found a predicted main effect of action-effect interval (F(2,22)=4.38, 
p=.02). Post-hoc testing showed that participants experienced stronger sense of agency with 
100 msec response-effect intervals than with 500 msec (p=.007). Importantly, predictability 
of the effect did not differently influence sense of agency across compatible and incompatible 
trials, as there was no significant interaction between action-effect interval and compatibility 
(F(2,22)=.84, p=.44). Finally, neither the interaction between action-effect interval and 
stimulation site (F(4,44)=1.63, p=.18) nor the three-way interaction between all the factors 
(F(4,44)=.35, p=.83) were significant. Thus TMS applied to IPC disrupted the influence of 
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action-selection compatibility on sense of agency, irrespective of post action-selection 
components, such as the action-effect interval.  
 
--------------- Insert Figure 2 about here --------------- 
 
2.3.4. Sensitivity analyses 
Stimulation intensity was set for each participant and each site separately. Therefore, we 
investigated whether the size of the compatibility effect in each condition might simply 
reflect the variations in TMS intensity. We calculated a (net) compatibility effect by 
subtracting control ratings in incompatible trials from those obtained in compatible trials for 
each stimulation site (IPC and DLPFC). We then correlated the compatibility effect and 
intensity of TMS across participants in each condition. We found positive correlations 
between stimulation intensity and compatibility effects on control ratings, but these were 
weak, and far from statistically significant (IPC: R=.27, p=.39; DLPFC: R=.20, p=.51).  Thus, 
IPC stimulation effectively abolished the group mean compatibility effect, irrespective of 
individual variations in TMS intensity. This combination of results suggests that the presence 
of IPC stimulation, rather than our method of individual stimulation intensity adjustment, was 
responsible for the change in control ratings.  
The positive correlation between TMS intensity and compatibility effect is also 
relevant for interpreting the DLPFC data. The null effect of DLPFC stimulation on control 
ratings might, in principle, be a simple consequence of the lower intensity of stimulation used 
for DLPFC, compared to IPC. In that case, DLPFC stimulation intensity should be directly 
related to compatibility effects on control ratings, yet no such effect was found. 
 
 
 17 
2.4. Preliminary discussion 
 
Previous studies have shown that prime-target compatibility modulates the sense of agency 
over the external consequences of movement (Wenke et al., 2010; Chambon & Haggard, 
2012; Chambon et al., 2013). Incompatible prime-target pairings reduce the sense of agency, 
an effect that is associated with increased activity in the left IPC (Chambon et al., 2013). The 
results from the present study confirm the role of left IPC, showing that TMS-induced 
disruption of activity within this region essentially abolished the compatibility effect. 
Importantly, TMS had no effect on reaction times. Thus, while TMS stimulation had 
significant effects on sense of agency, it did not influence task performance. There are several 
other examples of dissociation between sense of agency and action performance. For 
example, changing the timing parameters of masking has profound effects on action 
performance (reversing the positive compatibility effect to produce a ‘negative compatibility 
effect’, resulting in increased response latencies), but leaves the priming effects on sense of 
agency unchanged (Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Stenner et al., 2014). Sense of agency and 
motor control could rely on different components and would recruit different circuits 
accordingly. Thus, TMS over IPC would not interfere with action selection processing itself, 
since that would presumably influence performance. Rather, TMS over IPC would interfere 
with a circuit that monitors action selection signals to construct the experience of control – a 
possibility we suggested in a previous model (Chambon & Haggard, 2012). Finally, there 
were no significant effects of left DLPFC stimulation. Because the level of stimulation was 
lower for DLPFC than for IPC, for reasons of participant acceptability, we cannot conclude 
that DLPFC stimulation is ineffective. 
Traditionally, IPC is thought to play a role in late retrospective aspects of sense of 
agency by monitoring the consistency between predicted and actual sensory consequences of 
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movement (David et al., 2008, for a review). However, the present findings suggest that the 
IPC may also be involved in earlier prospective aspects of sense of agency. In Experiment 2 
we directly investigated this by varying the timing of TMS over left IPC. Stimulation was 
either delivered 70 msec after target onset, TMS delivered 70 msec after the key press, or 
TMS delivered 70 msec after the presentation of the colour effect (there was also a no-
stimulation condition). If the IPC is involved in prospective aspects of sense of agency then 
the effect of stimulation should be most pronounced in the earlier stages of action execution. 
Owing to the lack of an effect of DLPFC stimulation in Experiment 1 we focussed only on 
the IPC.  
 
 
3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Material & Methods 
 
3.1.1. Participants 
Twelve participants (6 females and 6 males aged 21–42 years), different from those tested in 
Experiment 1, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were recruited to participate in the 
study. They provided written informed consent prior to the experiment and were paid £10 for 
their participation. All participants were without any known contra-indications to TMS. The 
experiment was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee, and have therefore been 
performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
 
3.1.2. Behavioural task 
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The behavioural task (stimuli, timeline, and instructions) was identical to that used in 
Experiment 1. 
 
3.1.3. TMS methods 
TMS was only applied to the left IPC. The location (electrode P3) was identical to that used 
in Experiment 1. The intensity of the stimulation was set as before (mean = 53.08, S.D. = 
2.39), and did not significantly differ from that used in the first experiment (p=.88). Only the 
timing of stimulation changed. Thus, during the trial there was either: no TMS stimulation, 
TMS delivered 70 msec after target onset, TMS delivered 70 msec after the key press, or 
TMS delivered 70 msec after the presentation of the colour effect (Figure 3). The timing of 
stimulation was randomised across trials. 
 
3.2. Data Analyses 
Error rates (ERs) response times (RTs), and control ratings were analysed independently 
using a 2×4 repeated-measures ANOVA with prime-target compatibility (compatible vs. 
incompatible) and timing of stimulation (No-TMS vs. target vs. key-press vs. effect) as 
within-subjects factors. Post-hoc Fisher tests were used to identify differences between 
conditions. Finally, as in Experiment 1, we performed correlation analyses between control 
ratings and intensity of the stimulation over IPC. 
 
--------------- Insert Figure 3 about here --------------- 
 
3.3. Results 
 
3.3.1. Reaction times 
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The main effect of prime-target compatibility was significant (F(1,11)=33.15, p<.001). 
Neither the main effect of the timing of stimulation (F(3,33)=.42, p=.73) nor the interaction 
between compatibility and timing were significant (F(3,33)=.15, p=.92).  
  
3.3.2. Error rates  
Participants tended to make more errors in incompatible than in compatible trials (main effect 
of compatibility: F(1,11)=4.2, p=.06). As for response times, neither the main effect of the 
timing of stimulation (F(3,33)=.14, p=.93) nor the interaction between compatibility and 
timing were significant (F(3,33)=.18, p=.9). 
 
3.3.3. Control ratings 
The main effect of prime-target compatibility (F(1,11)=3.75, p=.07), as well as the main 
effect of the timing of stimulation (F(3,33)=.8, p=.49) did not reach significance. Importantly, 
however, the effect of compatibility on control was significantly influenced by the timing of 
stimulation, as shown by the interaction between the two factors (F(3,33)=4.16, p=.01) 
(Figure 4). Thus, TMS applied to IPC shortly after target, or after response onset reversed or 
largely abolished (p=.3, .58 respectively) the effect of compatibility. In contrast, clear effects 
prime compatibility on control ratings were found in the No-TMS condition (p<.001), or 
when TMS was applied shortly after presentation of the action effect (p=.02). Comparing 
trials across the different timings of stimulation revealed an effect of TMS stimulation on 
incompatible trials only with higher control ratings for post-target TMS than for post-effect 
TMS (p=.03), and also for post-target TMS compared to no TMS (p=.001). 
 
3.3.4. Sensitivity analyses 
Correlation analyses between the compatibility effect and the intensity of the stimulator 
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output for each timing of stimulation did not reveal any significant associations, whether 
TMS was delivered after target onset (R=.11, p=.71), action onset (R=.25, p=.42), or action-
effect onset (R=-.31, p=.32).  
 
--------------- Insert Figure 4 about here --------------- 
 
 
3.4. Preliminary discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 suggested that left IPC may be involved in early prospective 
aspects of sense of agency. In Experiment 2 we directly contrasted prospective and 
retrospective contributions to sense of agency by varying the timing of TMS over IPC. It was 
found that the compatibility effect was abolished following stimulation delivered 70 msec 
after target onset and also 70 msec after the key press. However, the compatibility effect re-
emerged if stimulation was delivered 70 msec after the presentation of the colour effect. 
Crucially, TMS again had no effect on RTs, ruling out interpretations based on disruption of 
action execution. This pattern of results provides compelling evidence that left IPC is 
causally involved in computing sense of agency, that these computations involve prospective, 
premotor information, and that these computations occur around the time of action selection 
and execution. The prospective contribution of left IPC to sense of agency can thus be 
distinguished from other functions such as action outcome monitoring. Interestingly, Farrer 
and colleagues (2008) demonstrated a role of IPC in action outcome monitoring, but found a 
bilateral IPC activation, which was slightly more ventral than the IPC stimulation site used 
here. In Farrer et al.’s study, IPC activation varied with mismatch between predicted and 
actual sensory consequences of an action, while IPC activation in our previous fMRI study 
was elicited by a mismatch between a prime-induced intention and response to a target 
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(Chambon et al., 2013). The different localization found in Farrer et al.’s study and ours 
could thus reflect a subdivision within the inferior parietal cortex, with more dorsal IPC being 
involved in detecting mismatch between intention and action, while more ventral IPC would 
be involved in comparing predicted and actual consequences of an action. 
 
 
4. General Discussion 
 
Previous studies have shown that the fluency or dysfluency of action selection influences the 
sense of agency over an external sensory event (Wenke et al., 2010; Chambon et al., 2012; 
Haggard & Chambon, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013). Furthermore, recent fMRI data suggests 
that this early prospective contribution to sense of agency is supported by a network 
involving left DLPFC and left IPC (Chambon et al., 2013). We directly tested this hypothesis, 
using single-pulse TMS to selectively disrupt activity in DLPFC or IPC. In a first experiment, 
we confirmed the importance of left IPC by showing that TMS here abolished the priming 
effect on judgments of control. TMS over left DLPFC had no significant effect on task 
performance. In a second experiment, we showed that this contribution of left IPC is limited 
to early preparation and execution phases of movement.  
In our study, the inferior parietal cortex was targeted by the P3 electrode position, as in 
previous studies (Kessels et al., 2000; Muri et al., 2002; Vesia et al., 2010). One recent study 
argued that this method carries a much greater type II error than targeting based on fMRI 
localisers (Sack et al., 2009), at least for studies of numerical cognition. However, the loss of 
power associated with scalp-based neurotargeting must depend on the localisation in the brain 
of the cognitive function under study. When there are large individual differences in the brain 
area where a function is localised (e.g., Nieto-Castañón & Fedorenko, 2012), coil placement 
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based on individual fMRI is clearly preferable. However, scalp-based coil placement may be 
relatively successful where individual differences in functional localisation are small, and 
where the relation between scalp location and underlying brain area is known and stable. 
Interestingly, we found a significant effect of TMS on compatibility-related sense of agency 
in Experiment 1, despite the relatively small number of participants and the allegedly low 
power of the coil placement technique. Moreover, we then replicated this effect in a new 
group of participants in Experiment 2.  
The results of the present study confirm and extend the findings from a recent fMRI 
study (Chambon et al., 2013). By abolishing the compatibility effect with TMS over IPC we 
provide causal evidence of its role in prospective aspects of sense of agency. Furthermore, by 
exploiting the temporal specificity of single-pulse TMS we were able to pinpoint the precise 
timing of IPC involvement. The results show, for the first time, that the contribution of IPC to 
the sense of agency includes early, prospective components related to action selection and 
action programming. The contribution of IPC to prospective aspects of agency did not depend 
on processing at the time of action outcomes, because TMS at the time of action outcomes 
did not influence compatibility effects on control ratings. 
Previously it has been suggested that the IPC (i.e., the angular gyrus) is involved in the 
retrospective construction of sense of agency by monitoring the consistency between 
predicted and actual sensory consequences of movements (e.g., Farrer et al., 2008). When 
these predictions are violated sense of agency is reduced, and IPC activity is increased. Our 
results do not disagree with this view of IPC function, and are indeed independent of it. 
Rather, we set out to investigate whether IPC might play an additional role, at the much 
earlier time-point of action selection. More specifically, our results show that, by monitoring 
the consistency between action plans and required actions, the IPC is involved in the 
prospective construction of sense of agency. As suggested above, these two putative 
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functions for IPC may reflect a functional subdivision within the inferior parietal cortex, with 
more ventral IPC being involved in retrospectively monitoring the link between the action 
and the consequences of this action (Farrer et al., 2008), while more dorsal IPC would be 
involved in monitoring the link between intention and action, prior to action execution and 
independent of action consequences (Chambon et al., 2013). 
The prospective and retrospective mechanisms have some general features in common. 
Both involve monitoring action-related signals or ‘cues’ as they become available, and 
comparing them with other relevant information for consistency. We suggest that monitoring 
and checking is a very general function of the IPC during instrumental action. Previous 
research has highlighted the contribution of various cues to sense of agency, in particular 
sensorimotor prediction and re-afferent sensory feedback (Moore et al., 2009). The present 
results suggest that information generated during the process of action selection is also 
monitored and checked in IPC. For example, initial action intentions, such as those caused by 
subliminal primes, could be checked for compatibility with the action subsequently 
performed. These action selection cues may provide an important ‘online’ marker of control 
as the action is unfolding. Not only would this provide an estimate of agency without the 
need to wait until sensory feedback becomes available, but as Chambon et al. (2013) have 
suggested, it may protect against aberrant experiences of agency. For example, the sense of 
agency in patients with schizophrenia is characterised by excessive reliance on re-afferent 
sensory information generated by their actions (Voss et al., 2010). Prospective signals, if 
available, may provide an important counterweight. 
Moore and Fletcher (2012) have recently suggested that the normal sense of agency 
involves the optimal integration of various sources of information. The present results 
suggest a candidate for the neural implementation of this cue integration. As stated above, the 
IPC appears to play a very general role in monitoring the consistency between various action 
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related signals. This would make the IPC ideally suited to the task of implementing cue 
integration. Our result suggests that action selection fluency may be one such cue. 
Chambon et al. (2013) showed that activation of IPC was negatively related to sense of 
control on incompatible prime-target trials, but unrelated to sense of control on compatible 
prime-target trials. This is consistent with previous fMRI data suggesting that IPC codes for 
lack of agency, while its activation in conditions of positive agency remains at baseline 
levels. That is, agency is a default backdrop to normal mental life rather than a distinctive 
phenomenal experience (Frith et al., 2000; Haggard, 2005; Chambon & Haggard, 2013). This 
view predicts that disruption of IPC might attenuate the reduction in sense of agency on 
incompatible trials only, where prime and target conflict produces a subjective loss of control 
accordingly. However, inspection of the results from Experiment 1 suggests that stimulation 
of IPC also reduced sense of agency on compatible trials. In Experiment 2, stimulation of IPC 
again reduced sense of agency on compatible trials, though an increased sense of agency on 
incompatible trials was now also observed. Including a neutral priming condition in future 
research would allow a clearer separation between the facilitation of agency by compatible 
primes, and the impairment of agency by incompatible primes. The present study suggests 
that IPC is involved in the influence of prime-compatibility on sense of control, but we 
cannot definitively say whether IPC involvement reflects a benefit of fluent action selection, 
a cost of dysfluent action selection, or both.  
This study has several limitations. First, stimulation was delivered 70 msec similarly 
after arrow presentation, key press, and colour presentation, to keep the timing of the TMS 
pulse constant across prospective (response and target onsets) and retrospective (effect onset) 
conditions, and to allow for strict comparisons across these conditions. However, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that, whether this stimulation timing was appropriate to alter 
prospective coding of agency, it might have missed any retrospective component. Indeed, 
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retrospective coding of agency may occur later, as suggested by the temporal course of a 
well-established index of retrospective matching process, i.e., the mismatch negativity (150-
250 msec post-stimulus; Garrido et al., 2009). Note however that the disruptive effect of 
TMS stimulation is thought to last for around 100 to 200 msec (see Thut et al., 2003, for a 
review); hence the temporal window of disruption used here should have hindered any 
process occurring up to 170-270 msec after stimulus, response, or effect onset. 
Second, although we found compelling evidence in support of the role of IPC, our 
results showed no statistically reliable effect following stimulation of DLPFC. One possible 
explanation for this is the high interindividual variability in the exact extent of DLPFC’s 
cytoarchitectonic and functional boundaries (Rajkowska & Goldman-Rakic, 1995a; 
Rajkowska & Goldman-Rakic, 1995b; Sanches et al., 2009). Combined with our scalp-based 
coil placement, this could potentially increase type II error (Sack et al., 2009). A second 
factor could be the lower stimulation intensity used for DLPFC compared with IPC, although 
our sensitivity analyses did not find direct evidence for this. The intensity of magnetic 
stimulation was determined for each individual by progressively increasing the intensity of 
the stimulator output up to a point where muscle twitches or significant discomfort occurred. 
Higher intensity stimulation might potentially have caused a significant increase in 
compatibility effect following DLPFC stimulation, but such a study might exceed the limits 
of acceptability. 
Third, we used explicit, rather than implicit, judgments of agency. Implicit judgements 
can also be affected by subliminal action priming (Stenner et al., 2014). Indeed, a 
disadvantage of explicit judgements is the risk of confounds with other aspects of action 
experience, such as task performance. We however believe such confound is unlikely to 
occur here, as prospective sense of agency and performance monitoring have been shown to 
clearly dissociate (e.g., Chambon & Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013; Sidarus et al., 
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2013; Damen et al., 2014). Explicit judgement has the merit that one clearly measures sense 
of agency, as consciously experienced by the subject, while implicit judgements can 
sometimes be criticised on the grounds that they do not unambiguously index the conscious 
experience of control (Moore & Sukhvinder, 2012). 
In summary, we provide, for the first time, direct evidence for the role of IPC in the 
prospective sense of agency. We found that TMS over IPC abolished the compatibility effect.  
A second experiment replicated these results, and showed that they were temporally 
restricted, occurring only at early stages of action preparation and execution. These results 
show that IPC is involved in construction of sense of agency much earlier than has been 
previously thought, and in advance of action outcomes. Crucially, our results point to an 
additional, prospective contribution of IPC to sense of agency, which is independent from its 
well-established role in matching predicted and actual consequences of action. We have 
suggested that this would be consistent with a more general role for the IPC in integrating and 
monitoring multiple action-related signals, including premotor signals. 
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Figure Legends 
 
Fig. 1 (a–b) Experimental procedure. (a) Sites of TMS stimulation (based on coordinate 
locations from Chambon et al., 2013). (b) Example trials. Upper panel: prime and action are 
compatible.  Lower panel: prime and action are incompatible. Prime and masks could appear 
randomly above or below fixation on each trial. The appearance of the effect was randomly 
jittered 100, 300, or 500 msec after the keypress action to increase the range of judgements of 
perceived control. TMS was delivered 70 msec after mask/target onset  
 
Fig. 2 Mean control ratings on compatible and incompatible trials, for each stimulation site. 
All error bars indicate SD. **: p<.01; ***: p<.001; ns.: p>.05 
 
Fig. 3 (a–b) Experimental procedure. (a) Site of TMS stimulation (left IPC at the coordinate 
location of Chambon et al., 2013). (b) Example trials from the 2 possible combinations of the 
prime-action compatibility (compatible: upper panel; incompatible: lower panel). TMS was 
delivered 70 msec after either mask/target onset (action selection), or action onset (action 
execution), or after the presentation of the action-effect  
 
Fig. 4 Mean control ratings for compatible and incompatible trials, for each timing of 
stimulation, and for the No-TMS condition. All error bars indicate SD. *: p<.05; ***: p<.001; 
ns.: p>.05 
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